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Introduction 
 
In England self-neglect has historically been excluded from statutory guidance on adult 
safeguarding, which focused exclusively on third party involvement in abuse and neglect 
(DH, 2000). The Care Act 2014 does not disturb that position but increasingly Local 
Safeguarding Adults Boards (LSABs) are nonetheless developing policies and procedures for 
self-neglect, drawing on an emerging evidence-base of effective practice (Braye et al., 2011; 
2014). Statutory guidance to the Care Act 2014 may yet comment on the interface between 
self-neglect and adult safeguarding. 
 
Whether addressed through adult safeguarding structures or adult social care, self-neglect 
commonly poses complex challenges to the agencies and practitioners involved. When an 
individual dies or suffers serious harm as a result of self-neglect, the LSAB may commission a 
serious case review (SCR) to identify what can be learnt but hitherto they have not been 
obliged to do so, or to publish the outcome. The Care Act 2014, which reforms adult social 
care and adult safeguarding law in England and Wales, now places a duty on LSABs 
(henceforth constituted on a statutory basis) to carry out and publish safeguarding adult 
reviews where serious abuse or neglect has contributed to the death or serious harm of an 
individual, and where there is reasonable cause for concern about how professionals and 
agencies have worked together. LSABs will also have a power to undertake reviews in other 
circumstances, such as self-neglect, the purpose throughout being to learn lessons and 
improve future practice.    
 
Despite the valuable lessons for local practice that emerge from individual reviews, no 
analysis of the consolidated findings from SCRs in cases of self-neglect had been conducted, 
prior to the present study.  The researchers analysed 40 SCRs that described situations of 
self-neglect.  A previous paper (Braye et al, forthcoming) considered the type of self-neglect 
involved and the key characteristics of each case and SCR. It then reviewed the 32 reports 
that were either published or available to the authors, focusing on the frequency of, and 
themes within, different types of recommendations. Four domains of analysis were used, 
namely the adult and their household/family, the team around the adult, the organisations 
around the team and the LSAB around the organisations.  The present paper extends this 
analysis and reports in detail on the content of the 32 self-neglect SCR reports, using the 
same four domains, to identify the professional and interagency challenges involved, and to 
extract learning that can be applied in developing notions of good self-neglect practice. 
 
SCRs and accountability  
 
Alongside retrieval of 40 SCRs from LSAB websites and personal contacts, searches of the 
Local Government Ombudsman website identified three self-neglect cases, none of which 
appear to have prompted an SCR (LGO, 2008; LGO, 2011; PHSO, 2011). Coroner Court 
statistics revealed 45 cases of neglect and/or self-neglect considered in 2011 and a further 
32 in 2012. Some have been reported in the media (for example, Harding, 2010; Anon, 2011) 
but not all prompted an SCR.  Some of the 40 SCRs, however, do refer to a parallel Coroner’s 
Court investigation, but not all SCR cases involving a death were referred to the Coroner. 
 
Arguably, some kind of review is necessary in cases of death from self-neglect to comply 
with positive obligations in Articles 2 and 3, European Convention of Human Rights. Such 
scrutiny should be prompt, independent and, where possible, involve family members, with 
the aim of accounting for the circumstances of the case (Flynn et al., 2011; Preston-Shoot, 
2014). The diverse routes to possible review of self-neglect cases may appear somewhat 
confusing. Indeed, some SCRs in the present study commented that better dialogue was 
required between the Coroner’s Office and adult safeguarding services regarding cases that 
may need reviewing, and stronger links between Serious Untoward Incident investigations in 
health settings and the SCR process. Although mandates vary between the Coroner (to 
establish cause of death), the Ombudsman (to investigate complaints) and SCR (to learn 
lessons), further consideration appears necessary of how these different forms of inquiry 
should interface and, in relation to self-neglect cases, what criteria should govern whether 
an LSAB commissions an SCR or some other kind of review. Finally, the possibility of multiple 
forms of inquiry, conducted under different mandates and with different purposes, might 
deter practitioners and managers from offering case and contextual details for the purposes 
of learning and strengthening the evidence-base for good practice.  
 
The adult safeguarding literature on SCRs is not extensive and detailed examination of their 
standards has been rare, although Scourfield (2010) provides one example. What has led 
LSABs to commission SCRs or other types of inquiry has not always been clear. Nor does the 
literature shed light on how the twin imperatives have been managed between holding 
practitioners and agencies accountable for their actions and inactions, and wanting to 
maximise learning for practice development and organisational development. However, 
there have been thematic analyses where learning disability (Manthorpe and Martineau, 
2013) and housing issues (Parry, 2013) have been central.   
 
Methods 
 
Full details of the approach taken to retrieve and analyse the SCRs are provided in the 
companion paper (Braye et al, forthcoming). Table One reproduces key details of the 32 
SCRs that form the focus of the present paper, which, as part of the overall sample of 40, 
were obtained through a systematic internet search of all English local authority and LSAB 
web pages (n = 152) and through personal contacts with LSAB Independent Chairs and 
Business Managers. Since SCRs currently do not have to be published, it is impossible to 
know what proportion of reviews into self-neglect cases has been captured by this sample. 
However, this sample does contain SCRs not captured in surveys by Manthorpe and 
Martineau (2011; 2013), Clay (2013) and Parry (2013). 
 
Table One: SCR sample 
Case  LSAB Document 
details 
Recommendations Circumstances 
1 Dudley (2010) Executive 
summary, 7 
pages 
None but 16 key 
issues for an action 
plan 
Died outdoors 
after requested 
hospital discharge 
2 Dudley (2010) Final Report, 12 
pages 
7 Died at home 
3 Nottinghamshire 
(2010) 
Executive 
summary, 19 
pages 
17 Died in hospital 
4 Sheffield (2010) Executive 
summary, 14 
pages 
9 with a further 7 
sub-elements 
Died at home  
5 Cornwall (2007) Executive 
summary, 9 
11 Died in hospital  
pages  
6 Cornwall (2009) Executive 
summary and 
action plan, 19 
pages 
4 with a further 8 
sub-elements 
Died at home 
7 Surrey (no date) Executive 
summary, 16 
pages 
19 Lived alone with 
family visits. Died 
in a house fire 
8 Southampton 
(2012) 
Executive 
summary, 14 
pages 
9 In Supported Living 
with some family 
contact. Died at 
home 
9 Birmingham (2010) Executive 
summary and 
action plan, 10 
pages 
9 Lived at home with 
family. Died in 
hospital 
10 Birmingham (2012) Executive 
summary, 15 
pages 
13 Died in a Care and 
Nursing home. Had 
family contact 
11 Warwickshire 
(2010) 
Serious Case 
Review, 63 
pages 
26, some with 
multiple elements, 6 
broader and 3 
national issues 
Own tenancy with 
support. Murdered 
12 Worcestershire 
(2010) 
Executive 
summary, 8 
pages 
8 Own home but also 
lived with his 
mother. Died at 
home  
13 Bath and North East 
Somerset (2011) 
Summary 
report, 8 pages 
6 Nursing home. 
Died of bowel 
complications 
14 Gloucestershire 
(2012) 
Executive 
summary, 12 
pages 
15 Lived alone with 
contact with son. 
Died in a house fire 
15 Torbay (2011) Executive 
summary, 11 
pages 
11 with 17 sub-
elements 
Some contact with 
mother. Died of 
liver failure 
16 North Yorkshire 
(2012) 
Executive 
summary, 22 
pages 
13 Died in a hotel 
room, having lived 
rough  
17 Westminster (2011) Executive 
summary, 49 
pages 
11 Lived with his wife. 
Died in hospital  
18 Kent and Medway 
(2003) 
Executive 
summary, 5 
pages 
12 with 11 action 
plan points for 
agencies 
Lived with parents. 
Died in hospital  
19 Kent and Medway 
(2013) 
Executive 
summary, 8 
pages 
9 Died in hospital  
20 Bournemouth 
(2010) 
Executive 
summary, 8 
pages 
20 Murdered by her 
son-in-law 
21 Dorset (2012) Executive 
summary, 7 
pages; 51 page 
overview 
report 
11 Lived with 
husband. Died in 
care home of 
stroke 
22 A Council (2011a) Not published, 
10 pages 
13 Shared tenancy. 
Died at home 
23 A Council (2011b) Not published, 
19 pages 
18 key findings, 6 
conclusions and 30 
single or multi-
agency 
recommendations 
Admitted to 
hospital and then 
care home; health 
and well-being 
improved 
24 Sheffield (2008)  Not published, 
13 pages 
4, with 12 sub-
elements 
Lived with son. 
Died of chronic 
obstructive 
pulmonary disease 
25 B Council (2013) Not published, 
Case review 
report, 8 pages 
11 Died in hospital of 
burns from fire at 
home 
26 Leeds (2009) Executive 
summary, 15 
pages 
14 Died in a house fire 
27 Northamptonshire 
(2010) 
Executive 
summary, 13 
pages 
8 Married couple. 
Died at home  
28 North Tyneside 
(2011) 
Final report, 26 
pages 
8 Lived with her 
brother. Died in 
hospital  
29 Lambeth (2012) Executive 
summary, 14 
pages 
9 Died sleeping 
rough 
30 C Council (2010) Not published, 
SCR overview 
report, 54 
pages 
23 Lived with her 
disabled son. Died 
in hospital  
31 C Council (2012) Not published, 
Multi-agency 
review, 11 
pages 
None but 3 areas for 
consideration 
Died in hospital  
32 Slough (2013) Executive 
summary, 9 
pages 
12 Died at home  
  
The following research questions were identified: 
 
1. What was the nature of the self-neglect cases reviewed through SCR processes? 
2. What themes emerged from the SCRs and how do these add to understanding about 
professional intervention in cases of self-neglect?  
3. How many and what kind of recommendations on self-neglect were made by SCRs 
and to which agencies were they addressed? 
 
The 32 available SCRs were read independently by two researchers to develop an index of 
key themes, which were then applied to classify the content of the reviews. All the SCR data 
were then grouped by theme into the domain matrix, allowing all material coming under 
each theme to be considered together. The domain matrix recognises the multiple layers 
within complex cases, namely individual histories and chronologies; service commissioning 
and provision; organisational issues such as supervision and communication between 
agencies, and national policy and legislation. The matrix, therefore, shines some light on the 
context within which decisions are made – organisational, legal and ethical. 
 
The reports were heavily oriented towards describing what took place rather than seeking to 
explain or appraise events (see also Flynn et al., 2011). This suggests that the methodology 
for analysing cases is still developing and faces similar challenges in seeking to account for 
outcomes to those in children’s safeguarding. Greater case complexity does not necessarily 
result in a higher number of recommendations. 
 
In the findings that follow, references to specific reports have not been used because not all 
SCRs have been published.   
 
Findings 
 
The themes emerging from the cross-case analysis are reported under the four domain 
headings and summarised in Table Two, with the focus placed on themes that were 
apparent in a significant proportion of the reports.  
 
Table Two: Domain matrix 
Domain Themes (and the number of SCRs in which they appeared) 
A. The practice interface 
with the individual adult 
(and their family/carer 
context) 
Person-centred approaches to intervention (19) 
Assessment of mental capacity (14) 
Consideration of the individual’s household, family and carers 
(19) 
Securing or maintaining engagement (15) 
History and patterns of behaviour (14) 
B. The professional team 
around the adult 
Interagency communication and collaboration (22) 
Information-sharing (14) 
Assessment, care planning, monitoring and review processes 
(19) 
Recording of information (10) 
Safeguarding literacy (21) 
Legal literacy (11) 
C. The organisations 
around the professional 
team 
Supervision and management (17) 
Organisational culture (5) 
Staffing (5) 
Organisational policies (6) 
D. Interagency governance 
exercised through the 
LSAB 
The process and function of SCRs (20) 
Monitoring and action planning (18) 
Interagency procedures and guidance (23) 
Training (19) 
 
Domain A: The practice interface with the individual adult (and their family/carer context) 
 
A dominant theme here was whether interventions had taken a person-centred approach, 
noting a failure to ‘see the person’.  Examples included cases where: 
 the individual’s views were not sought directly, nor was he engaged in discussion of the 
impact of his wishes on his treatment and prognosis; instead, assessment of his physical 
and mental health needs was based on information provided by his mother;  
 a safeguarding strategy meeting had focused only on the individual within the context of 
his couple relationship, resulting in his individual needs and anxieties being masked by 
his partner’s needs;  
 agencies struggled to work with an individual’s wife and carer, who was perceived as 
obstructing care, and lost any real focus on the individual himself almost disappeared; 
the possibility that she was complying with his wishes was not addressed;  
 professional networks became excessively preoccupied with the search for a diagnosis 
that could explain the individual’s vulnerability, or made assumptions about impairment 
that led to symptoms or behaviour change being discounted;  
 the individual was seen merely as the sum of their problem behaviours.  
 
Refusal of services, even in circumstances of evident and mounting risk, was taken at face 
value. Respecting an individual’s wishes can of course denote person-centred practice, but 
several SCRs indicated that taking a person-centred perspective on decisions to decline 
services would, instead, have meant fuller exploration, over time, of those decisions with 
the individual involved. Several reports commented on: 
 practice that lacked a person centred focus, noting little attempt to establish a 
relationship of trust and cooperation that could have facilitated greater acceptance of 
support; 
 lack of insight into family background and no evidence of work by professionals to 
explore the motivation and understanding behind decisions to decline services;  
 acceptance of refusals of service, leaving professionals working reactively to each crisis 
rather than proactively engaging with repeated refusals of support; 
 failure to monitor changing needs in order to be ready to respond when the individual 
did recognise the need for help;  
 missed opportunities to work with what the individual was prepared to engage about, 
commenting that attention to those perceived important issues might have facilitated a 
more positive relationship.   
 
Essentially, an emphasis on relationship-building and trust through which on-going 
assessment could have been achieved became lost in the drive to find tangible solutions and 
services. 
 
Mental capacity was another dominant theme, commonly failure to assess and record 
capacity appropriately, relying instead on assumptions, and (where capacity had been 
assessed) failure to re-assess as circumstances changed. In one case a psychiatrist assessed a 
person’s capacity through interviews with the individual’s mother, while he was sleeping, 
forming the view that he did have capacity to refuse hospital admission. Paradoxically, there 
was evidence too of professionals accepting that his mother was acting in his best interests, 
implying a view that he lacked capacity. A later capacity assessment resulted in a best 
interests intervention to amputate both his legs as treatment for gangrene.  
 
Several reviews commented on lack of reference to legislation where it might be expected, 
raising concerns that the Mental Capacity Act was not being used as a framework (and 
therefore that insufficient attention was being paid to the possibility of best interests 
interventions). One report for example emphasised the need for professionals to understand 
the limits of the family’s decision-making role and to fulfil their own responsibilities to act in 
best interests. Similarly there were concerns that the principle of presumption of capacity to 
refuse services was being followed without question, with no evidence of support to 
understand information relevant to choices being made, or no re-examination of capacity 
even where rapid deterioration (in the case of body weight, for example) indicated it may 
have changed. Such omissions were seen as contributing to failure to intervene to mitigate 
risk, one SCR concluding that risky and self-neglectful behaviour per se engages a need 
explicitly to assess capacity. A number recommended guidance for when adults have 
capacity but place themselves at significant risk. 
 
A further common theme was the attention paid to an individual’s household, family and 
carers.  SCRs pointed to both over and under involvement with carers. Carers’ perspectives 
sometimes replaced seeking the wishes of the individual and deflected attention from what 
they may themselves have wanted, resulting in paralysis of action plans to address 
heightened risk.  
 
In contrast, insufficient attention might be paid to engagement with family members, 
resulting in lack of knowledge about who was living with the individual, what the 
relationship with them was, how the family functioned, and what use was being made of 
direct payments. A number of SCRs noted the absence of a carer’s assessment, or at least 
any evidence that such an assessment had in fact been offered, even in circumstances 
where the carer was struggling to cope. Occasionally there was little knowledge of systems 
that could support carers, or offers of re-assessments were not made despite considerable 
changes over time.  Elsewhere, dilemmas about confidentiality meant that family or 
community members were not approached about management of risk or dangers arising 
from disconnection of utilities.  Potentially concerning behaviour by members of the 
individual’s network was not always followed up. Carers were not challenged and family 
dynamics not explored, despite concerns that individuals were being manipulated and 
intimidated, leading one SCR to comment that agencies effectively abandoned the individual 
to his family.  
 
Difficulties of securing or maintaining engagement were a common theme. These could 
arise because the individual remained resistant to contact; for example one SCR warned 
against assuming that being ‘hard to engage’, in the sense of declining services, was 
indicative of informed choice being exercised; it ‘may be an alert that something is wrong 
which requires assessment and intervention’.  But commonly the SCRs commented on 
opportunities were lost through services’ lack of responsiveness, for example where cases 
were closed while risk remained high, or long periods passed without visits being made, or 
missed medical appointments were not followed up. Consistency of approach was 
compromised by changes of worker with each re-referral, and by decisions on eligibility that 
were not based on re-assessment of needs. A reputation for being ‘hard to engage’ could 
prompt case closure and refusal to reassess. SCRs were critical here, noting that such cases 
should not be closed without assessment of risk and capacity, and exploration of reasons for 
non-engagement, through which possible alternatives could emerge. A number mentioned 
the importance of considering the role of advocacy services where engagement is hard to 
establish. 
 
In some circumstances there was insufficient attention to history. SCRs reported incidents 
being treated in isolation rather than in the context of an unfolding pattern of behaviour; 
alternatively, presentations to different agencies were treated separately.  Four cases 
exemplified how professionals did not have sufficient historical understanding:  
 insufficient knowledge of the family and its dynamics led to misunderstanding of the 
potential for self-neglect; 
 professionals missed the significance of references in past records that would have given 
insight into the individual’s history (e.g., difficulties of engagement, negative 
experiences with statutory services, the relationship between expressed beliefs and 
cultural identity) and therefore into the reasons for his decisions; 
 no concerted attempts were made to secure a biographical perspective or to use such a 
perspective to guide best interests decisions; 
 insufficient exploration took place of the long-term impact of reclusive family behaviour, 
and the death of her mother, on an individual’s ability to care for herself and her 
surroundings. 
 
A final theme in the domain of the practice interface with the individual was highlighted in a 
small number of reports that drew attention to the interface between children’s and adult 
services. They noted the need to share information on family patterns and support needs, or 
on transition planning, to allow for more rounded assessments of individuals’ vulnerabilities 
and chronologies, and to facilitate a more personalised approach to their support. 
 
Domain B: The professional team around the adult 
 
Challenges of interagency communication and collaboration dominated here. Several SCRs 
noted the absence of overall ownership of any collaborative strategy. Practitioners operated 
in isolation within their own roles, failing to coordinate services even in circumstances 
where a case conference would have been warranted or where financial abuse required 
investigation.  The absence of shared understanding, collaborative working or full 
multidisciplinary assessment meant that not all the risks in an individual’s situation could be 
identified or addressed holistically, and it was unclear what key risks were, or who should 
take responsibility for issues such as capacity assessment. Professionals were confused 
about where responsibility lay between or even within agencies, and struggled to coordinate 
who would do what and when. The more agencies that became involved, the more marked 
was the failure to join up their efforts. Individual agency decisions, sometimes to limit 
interventions or responses, were taken in isolation. As one SCR notes, “no single agency or 
individual was directly responsible for what happened to ‘X’, but rather no statutory single 
agency that had contact with ‘X’ took responsibility for taking preventative and protective 
action”.   
 
Specific examples noted include: 
 shared multi-agency assessments were absent, and processes for including a 
comprehensive range of agencies in discussion and shared decision-making were 
missing; 
 individual agencies worked separately (and often well) on their own aspects of the 
situation, assuming other concerns would be addressed by someone else, or perhaps 
referring perceived problems onto adult social care but failing to follow this up; 
 agencies failed to respond, for example to missed appointments, or did not sufficiently 
acknowledge the concerns expressed by others; in one example a decision that the 
individual referred did not have a diagnosis that made them eligible, and that they had 
capacity to choose their lifestyle, influenced other agencies in their own involvement; 
 joint working or liaison was missing, or complex partnerships, for example between 
health, social work, mental health and learning disability services, and between 
children’s and adult services, broke down; 
misunderstanding about the roles and functions of other agencies led to critical referrals 
not being made; 
 constructive challenge between agencies was lacking. 
 
A linked concern was information-sharing, for instance the absence of formalised 
mechanisms through which professionals could share information in a timely and consistent 
way, or flag concern visibly to others, or construct a chronology that would connect isolated 
incidents and thus build a picture that might warrant intervention. In one case information 
was not effectively shared even between different parts of the same agency. In another, 
agencies often did not have access to information known to others; information-sharing 
appeared ad hoc rather than systematic. Other SCRs commented that sharing accurate 
information could have led to better coordination and joint working, or that its absence led 
to a significant sense of fragmentation. 
 
Assessment, care planning, monitoring and review processes were in many cases found to 
be flawed. At the point of assessment:   
 poor quality assessments meant that professional input lacked direction and purpose; 
 it was not clear whether and how mental health and mental capacity legislation had 
been considered;  
 no analysis of what might be causing particular behaviour was recorded; 
 risk assessments were not routinely or systematically undertaken, some risks were 
clearly missed; nor did they appear to underpin decision-making; 
 risk assessments were inconsistent, varying between practitioners; 
 a longitudinal view was lacking; each assessment reacted to presenting issues rather 
than contributing to an emerging picture over time;  
 
A frequently expressed concern was that assessments focused on establishing eligibility 
rather than a holistic understanding. Services were sometimes over-concerned with 
diagnosis as the threshold for access to services, particularly where an individual had a 
history of multiple and conflicting diagnoses. In one case the lack of relevant diagnosis and 
the misapplication of eligibility criteria, despite evidence of prior critical need, had ruled out 
an assessment and militated against the individual receiving timely and effective social care 
support. In another, while the individual did not meet criteria for safeguarding, an 
assessment if undertaken by either health or social services could have led to appropriate 
help being offered.  
 
In relation to intervention:  
 actions and timescales did not reflect levels of concern; for example, known risk of 
abuse did not result in a plan for protection; 
 not all risks were formally acknowledged or followed up;  
 immediate support needs were attended to at the expense of managing on-going risk 
patterns; 
 contingency plans that had been agreed for escalating risks were not implemented 
when the situation deteriorated;  
 when one potential legal remedy failed, other possible intervention routes were not 
revisited; 
 formal reviews were rare.  
 
Some reports commented on the approach taken by staff. One individual was admitted to a 
care home in a condition that evidenced inadequate prior professional care. Another report 
expressed concern at a lack of assertiveness and challenge in the face of service refusal, but 
noted also that workers were not trained in ways of doing this. The tension between safety 
and choice in one case presented staff with a challenge that led to paralysis rather than to a 
search for the right balance to be struck. Another SCR commented that practice was too 
heavily weighted towards the right to choose rather than the duty of care. A related concern 
was a perceived failure to engage actively with the individual regarding lifestyle choices that 
were deemed risky.  
 
The recording of information also drew comment. Missing or inadequate records, or 
divergent accounts of discussions between professionals, made it difficult to see patterns or 
escalation of risk or to account for practice. There were cases in which communications from 
other agencies were not placed on file. Written records did not routinely evidence what 
concerns were expressed, what help was offered and accepted or declined by the individual, 
what referrals were made and later followed-up, or what information was shared with 
others and what decisions taken. Records made reference to capacity assessment but did 
not consistently indicate whether an individual was deemed capable of making valid and 
informed decisions; records relating to best interests were sometimes contradictory, and did 
not evidence Mental Capacity Act compliance.  The IT system in two cases did not allow 
flagging of adults who were vulnerable or involved in safeguarding.   
 
The extent to which professionals showed safeguarding literacy was questioned. Many 
situations of self-neglect also showed abuse or neglect by a third party, yet safeguarding 
alerts were not triggered, with staff appearing unclear about when and how to report. 
Different professionals lacked awareness and/or understanding of safeguarding guidance 
and procedures, including those on the investigation of financial abuse, and the importance 
of taking adult protection concerns into account on hospital discharge. In one case when the 
individual denied that she was being exploited, agencies’ recognition of her right to choose 
to put herself at risk resulted in failure to explore with her the impact of her vulnerability.  
Circumstances where safeguarding alerts had not been made but were deemed warranted 
included situations of addiction and dependency, accumulation of concerns over 
impoverished and squalid conditions, inadequate care and serious neglect and poor self-
care, diet and medication with multiple indications of abuse where incidents were treated in 
isolation by the police. 
 
Implementation of safeguarding procedures was also criticised. Safeguarding was seen as 
the responsibility of adult social care, other agencies sometimes showing insufficient 
understanding of their contribution to on-going measures. Intervention could be 
insufficiently well coordinated, as when both ambulance service and police did not ensure 
the safety of an older woman who was confused and disorientated following a domestic 
violence incident, with no urgent follow up by adult social care of possible financial abuse. 
In other cases, the needs of one vulnerable individual causing harm to another were not 
sufficiently taken into account. 
 
Legal literacy was also questioned, with concerns expressed about varying and confused 
levels of understanding about: 
 rules on information sharing; 
 options for intervention, both with and without consent; 
 failure to recognise the need for timely legal advice; 
 mental capacity legislation and procedures, and the interface between the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 and the Mental Health Act 1983; 
 the need for assessment under both housing and community care legislation before 
judgements about eligibility for services; 
 duties and powers towards carers (and in one case misunderstanding of carer’s role in 
consenting to treatment on behalf of an individual); 
 the status of statutory guidance.  
 
Domain C: The organisations around the professional team 
 
Supervision and management emerged as a significant theme, and were seen as serving 
two key functions - staff support and managerial case oversight. There were situations in 
which staff felt isolated, particularly out of hours, and in high-risk situations without the 
support or authority to manage them effectively. In another case, frontline workers 
experienced difficulty deciding whether a case reached the adult safeguarding threshold, 
and needed support both to recognise the role that other agencies might play and to secure 
their involvement. In other cases, line managers and safeguarding leads did not recognise 
risks to staff or a care manager’s lack of experience of safeguarding. Complex and high-risk 
cases require greater managerial coordination, with managers responsible for bringing 
objectivity and challenge, and for leading and monitoring practice, including the standard 
and content of records, implementation of agreed procedures, the use of training, and 
culture and processes within multiagency meetings.  
 
Three additional organisational themes are important to mention, despite surfacing in 
relatively few reports. Organisational culture was seen as an important contributor to the 
environment in which practice took place, particularly in relation to the power dynamics of 
user/professional negotiations. In one case personalisation was seen as requiring significant 
culture change - a move away from eligibility based on diagnosis or IQ towards an approach 
based on need and risk, which considers the whole person. In another, everyone working 
with the individual appeared to respect - either from professional values or from 
powerlessness in the face of her intransigence - her right to decide the pattern of services 
and the level of risk present in her life. However, the SCR made the point that such sharing 
of power is complex and should not imply a ‘take it or leave it’ approach to service provision.  
While assessments needed to be built on a service user-led perspective, they needed too to 
explore and sometimes challenge reluctance to engage. Important too was a culture of 
challenge and debate between agencies, who were encouraged to seek clarity from each 
other, to escalate concerns, and to follow up on referrals made to others to ensure action is 
taken, rather than merely passing on concerns. 
 
Staffing was significant in some situations, and seen as impacting on the kind of work that 
could be done, with vacancies and insufficient staffing levels leading to reactive rather than 
proactive work. Inexperienced staff in two cases failed to recognise the seriousness of the 
individual’s situation and did not take appropriate action; the report emphasised the 
dangers of having too few experienced care workers and duty managers covering high risk 
and urgent situations. Other reports questioned reliance on single or part-time practitioners 
to manage complex risks and demanding cases over a lengthy period, and recommended co-
working or changes of worker.  
 
While interagency policies and procedures are considered in the final domain below, single 
organisational policies came in for criticism. Examples included: 
 insufficient guidance to staff on how to respond if a tenant was thought to require 
health care; 
 lack of attention to the need for a multiagency approach to be considered even where 
safeguarding thresholds were not met; 
 absence of formal policies on up-to-date recording of visits and actions, referrals to 
others, discussions with managers, and all key decisions and their rationale, with records 
to be dated, with the author identified; 
gaps in records by out of hours services. 
 
Domain D: The local safeguarding adult board around the organisations: the exercise of 
interagency governance 
 
SCRs were seen as a key means of improving services. Many reports commented on the 
process of conducting reviews and/or the use to which they should be put.  Delay in 
conducting SCRs was noted, caused by lack of systematic processes for referral and 
communication between safeguarding officers, the Board and the SCR sub-group, and by 
misunderstanding of the interface between this process and police and Coroner 
investigations. SCRs were commonly informed by management reviews (IMRs), conducted in 
the individual agencies involved. There was a perceived need for staff training on the 
conduct of IMRs, improved timeframes for IMR completion, communication between the 
SCR panel and IMR writers, and guidelines on the format and level of detail required. One 
report required agencies to review their IMRs in the light of the SCR finding of 
inconsistencies in the IMR investigations.  
 
Some reports indicated that the findings should be used in training or disseminated to all 
and/or some targeted agencies. Some recommended publication of executive summaries 
after being shared with family members and staff directly affected. 
 
Action planning and monitoring of progress was commonly prescribed. The LSAB was 
positioned to hold agencies accountable for implementing recommendations, disseminating 
learning and ensuring procedural compliance. In one case the LSAB was to hold a final case 
conference review to assure itself that all the risks and issues raised in the SCR had been 
addressed. Sometimes the LSAB itself was allocated work to take forward, for example: 
exploration of ways of working with vulnerable adults with capacity who put themselves and 
others at significant risk of harm; and creation of a multiagency safeguarding hub to 
enhance cross-boundary work and engage in multidisciplinary critical practice conferences; 
audit of safeguarding training across agencies, looking for evidence of impact on practice. In 
two cases the composition of the LSAB itself required improvement, with representation 
from housing and from GPs seen as important.   
 
Training came in for frequent mention. Specific topics identified as priorities included: adult 
safeguarding awareness and multiagency processes; carers’ assessments; fire risks; alcohol 
dependency and issues of capacity and choice; principles and processes of capacity 
assessment and best interest decision-making; homelessness and eligibility criteria; legal 
frameworks; managing confrontation; data protection and a duty of care. Accurate records 
of who had received what training were deemed important, along with evaluation of its 
effectiveness. The importance of attendance by medical and health professionals, housing 
staff and emergency duty teams was emphasised. Joint training was highlighted to embed a 
shared safeguarding culture, reinforced by on-going refresher information, supervision and 
discussion.  
 
The most dominant theme in Domain D, however, was the significance SCRs attached to 
procedures and guidance. Review of procedures was recommended with a view to clarifying 
the interface between self-neglect and safeguarding, and also to determine how they 
address service or treatment refusal or disengagement. Related to this was the need to 
ensure that person-centred principles were embedded in all policies and guidance, along 
with procedures on risk recognition and management. These might include an identification 
and monitoring process for people who are vulnerable but do not meet safeguarding 
thresholds, review of definitions and triggers for safeguarding and use of a template for 
recording risk assessments and decisions at safeguarding meetings.  
 
A large number of additional ‘procedural gaps’ were identified, with recommendations that 
LSABs should work to fill these. Gaps included: 
 Protocols on information sharing, hoarding, out of hours services, GP involvement, fire 
risk, risk recognition, conduct of IMRs and provision of medical and social care; 
 Systems for following up non-attendance at outpatient appointments, feedback to 
referrers, flagging concerns, accessing advocacy services and facilitating focused 
discussion in safeguarding meetings; 
 Guidance on facilitating family involvement, working with abuse by family and friends in 
self-neglect cases, identifying vulnerable adults and making appropriate referrals, 
escalating multiple low-level concerns, assessing mental capacity, preventing 
homelessness and working with adults with drug and alcohol dependency; 
 Joint agency agreement about no discharge from a service without a safeguarding 
meeting. 
 
Paradoxically, while often recommending new or revised procedures, SCRs commonly found 
that staff awareness of those that already existed was problematic.  Staff were either not 
aware of procedures, or did not use them when identifying levels of risk and the appropriate 
response, or engaging with mental capacity, or notifying safeguarding concerns. This 
prompted recommendations for measures to ensure stronger compliance.  
 
Concluding discussion 
 
Inevitably, given the focus of SCRs and the context in which they take place, the above 
analysis prioritises perceived needs for improvements in multiagency self-neglect practice. 
Sought improvements reside in all four domains of the analytic framework. Perhaps 
reflecting their different mandates, Coroner judgements and Ombudsman reports are more 
strident in their critiques of policy and practice. Coroners have referred to failures of 
communication and to contradictions and inadequacies in the legal rules which constrained 
a duty of care (Harding, 2010; Anon, 2011). However, judgements and reports also highlight 
similar concerns, including incomplete records, flawed assessments and care plans, and 
leaving unexplored people’s decisions and resistance to help (LGO, 2008), and comment on  
failure to manage risks, to review assessments and to recognise incapacity when living 
conditions were deteriorating, and on inadequate supervision and unmanageable workloads 
(LGO, 2011; PHSO, 2011). 
 
More complex is why such concerns emerge in self-neglect policy and practice. Certainly, 
working with adults who self-neglect is demanding and staff qualifications, experience and 
training may have proved insufficient; equally thresholds for involvement, particularly of an 
on-going nature in the light of service refusal, may have been set too high or applied too 
rigidly because of funding constraints (Manthorpe and Martineau, 2013; Braye et al., 2014). 
The emphasis on personalisation and the assumption of mental capacity may have 
influenced how practitioners approach questions of choice and lifestyle (Keywood, 2010). 
Faced with hostility, intransigence, resistance and aggression, agency responses may have 
come to mirror the same behaviour.  
 
SCRs do not explore to any great degree the feelings, values and beliefs of those involved, or 
the forces whether ethical or organisational that underpinned action. Yet organisations’ 
culture and resource context is central to practice.  Equally fundamentally, self-neglect taps 
into unresolved ethical tensions, visible in legal powers that are (experienced as) ambiguous, 
even contradictory, use of autonomy without clarification of whether it is negative or 
positive freedom that is being prioritised, and worries about paternalism rather than 
consideration of safeguards when balancing human rights with state intervention as an 
expression of a duty of care (Scourfield, 2010; Preston-Shoot and Cornish, 2014). Perhaps 
that is why SCRs do not conclude that person-centred care may ultimately mean respecting 
choice that has been fully explored, but rather convey a tenor that more should have been 
done. Perhaps, too, it explains the move to further proceduralise, when evidence suggests 
that staff do not use what they already have in terms of legal mandates and guidance. 
Service users and staff are assumed to be rational actors who make sensible decisions when 
they are in fact social actors who mediate personal, social, psychological and political 
constraints on their choices.  The next level of scrutiny needed by SCRs is, then, not just 
tangible mechanisms, such as workloads, training, procedures and supervision, but how 
values and beliefs, for example about responsibility, choice, autonomy and care, impact on 
individuals and multi-agency systems. 
 
Thus, the four domains are interlinked and a whole system approach to change required. 
Maintaining engagement, for example, requires organisational structures that offer 
flexibility in care management arrangements. Effective information-sharing and multi-
agency working depend on the procedures agreed by and relationships established in the 
LSAB. Legal and safeguarding literacy, and the thoroughness of individual mental capacity 
assessments, will be influenced by training and also subsequent management support. The 
majority of the SCRs where publication dates are known post-date implementation of the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005 and the training that accompanied it, reinforcing that training 
alone will not enable practitioners to acquire and retain skills, confidence and 
understanding. SCRs perhaps underplay the interface between their different 
recommendations and, by focusing on them, LSABs too might overlook a key lesson that 
system change requires all the many components of effective practice to develop in a co-
ordinated fashion. 
 
Complex challenges notwithstanding, the SCRs studied here also identified good practice, 
where procedures were followed, there was robust joint working on risk and capacity 
assessments, information was shared and alerts were raised. Sometimes they noted active 
and persistent efforts to engage individuals. Both the shortcomings and the strengths 
identified in the reviews, designed to learn lessons from often tragic circumstances, 
triangulate well with findings from other research designed to identify what can be learnt 
from positive outcomes (Braye et al., 2014). What emerges is that these are achieved when 
all domains – individual, team, organisation and interagency governance - are robust and are 
well-synchronised.  Clear procedures and protocols can facilitate successful work by 
practitioners; locating self-neglect work within safeguarding policies promotes strong 
multiagency engagement; effective management oversight helps practitioners to manage 
the personal experience of this work; and good practice privileges building relationships 
over time, understanding the whole person, devising flexible interventions, and using multi-
agency resources to assess risks and mental capacity. Systematic dissemination of SCR 
findings has yet to become routine, but may further inform policy development and practice 
standards. This paper offers one contribution for learning and service improvement. 
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